




russian analytical digest  19/07
Analysis
Th e Regional Dimension of Russia’s 2007–2008 Elections
By J. Paul Goode, Norman, Oklahoma
Abstract
Th e key to Russia’s presidential and parliamentary elections lies in the regions. Th e March 2007 regional 
elections show that United Russia will continue to dominate, but that it will face new challenges from the 
rapidly rising Just Russia. Th e new party could help stimulate the fracturing of the regional elite. If the gov-
ernors are willing to take risks, they may have increased infl uence over the course of the 2007 parliamentary 
elections. Moreover, the rise of Just Russia could make it diﬃ  cult for the center to maintain control over 
the regions.
Understanding the Regional Dimension
While Russia’s parliamentary and presidential elec-tions are sometimes lacking in surprises, there 
is no shortage of intrigue to the campaign battles 
on the regional level. In the parliamentary race, the 
domination of the current “party of power” over the 
last two electoral cycles was forged in Russia’s regions. 
Unity made its surprising gains in 1999 by contesting 
the provincial seats traditionally taken by the Com-
munist Party (CPRF). In 2003, United Russia’s (UR) 
federal party list contained just 4 names, while the 
rest of its 117 mandates went to regional party lists. 
In the upcoming elections, the regional eﬀ ect has 
been strengthened by President Vladimir Putin’s post-
Beslan reforms to transform governors into Kremlin-
appointed oﬃ  cials, and to eliminate the State Duma’s 
single member districts. Voting for regional party 
lists provides an indicator of the relative strengths of 
Russia’s national parties heading into the parliamen-
tary campaign season. Th e composition of regional 
assemblies provides an additional indication of the co-
hesiveness (or fragmentation) of regional elites, which 
will determine parties’ expectations and tactics for 
December 2007, while Putin’s governors play a cru-
cial role in mobilizing support for the “party of power” 
and managing confl icts among regional elites. 
Th e regional dimension of national elections is 
equally signifi cant in the presidential race. In the run 
up to 1996, Boris Yeltsin’s realization that the opposi-
tion’s support was located outside of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg led him to court the governors with a spate 
of bilateral power-sharing treaties. Putin’s victory in 
2000 depended upon Unity’s success in meeting the 
challenge posed by Fatherland-All Russia in the re-
gions – despite the latter’s strong cohort of governors 
– in order to sink Yevgenii Primakov’s presidential aspi-
rations. In the 2004 election, the Kremlin relied upon 
the governors to ensure that Putin’s vote matched, if 
not exceeded, the vote for United Russia in December 
2003 and, most importantly, to come up with creative 
ways to ensure suﬃ  cient turnout and avoid a runoﬀ .
Regarding both parliamentary and presidential 
elections, one must recall that Russia’s “political tech-
nology” industry does not simply spring in and out 
of existence every four years. Th e art of campaign-
ing and manipulating election outcomes is crafted in 
regional political contests. Th ose who are successful 
in running regional campaigns in federal elections 
often fi nd their way into regional government or are 
positioned in territorial branches to exercise kontrol’ 
(oversight) in regional administrations and assemblies. 
And, once in power, they are expected to deliver the 
vote for the “party of power” in the next round of fed-
eral elections.
Yet the regional campaigns can also be a source 
of uncertainty and distress for the Kremlin. Russia’s 
provinces provide a laboratory (sometimes a lightning 
rod) for various kinds of legal and political experimen-
tation. Th ey can pull the center in unanticipated direc-
tions, compel a response when the center would rather 
not intervene, or otherwise require the Kremlin to rein 
in over-zealous federal agents in territorial branches of 
the federal government. In other words, the strength-
ening of the “ruling vertical” and the “dictatorship of 
law” in the regions do not protect the center from the 
law of unintended consequences. 
In the upcoming parliamentary and presidential 
elections, those consequences are less related to popu-
lar choice than to the dynamics of elite competition 
in the regions. If UR has relied upon its monopoly 
position to guarantee the cohesive backing of re-
gional elites, the upcoming electoral cycle threatens 
to diminish that position by pushing hidden confl icts 
among political and economic elites into the open. Th e 
Kremlin clearly expects Russia’s governors to prevent 
this from happening and to lead the campaign for the 
“party of power” in the regions, just as they have led re-
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Yet latent ambiguities and contradictions in the gov-
ernors’ relations with the Presidential Administration, 
as well as ongoing tensions in center-regional relations, 
may disrupt their position in relation to the regional 
elite and inject a degree of uncertainty in the process. 
Consider, for instance, the transformation of Russia’s 
governors from elected to appointed oﬃ  cials. Now that 
the governors are appointed by the Kremlin, they also 
represent a signifi cant source of political and material 
patronage that signifi cantly raises the stakes in presi-
dential elections. Russia’s next president will have the 
power to hire and fi re governors across all of Russia’s 
regions, and one would expect that Putin’s designated 
successor will continue the current practice of leaving 
incumbent governors in place as long as they stay loyal 
and maintain stability in the provinces. But the power 
of appointment may help other candidates to punch 
above their weight by linking up with regional elites 
seeking a change of governor (particularly where may-
ors of regional capitals or speakers of regional assem-
blies oppose incumbent governors). Th is could create 
incentives for presidential candidates to compromise 
with competing elite factions, complicating the ability 
of Putin’s designated successor to achieve a fi rst round 
victory.
Th e Lessons of March 2007 
Just as elections for the State Duma traditionally serve as primaries for Russia’s presidential elections, 
regional elections are often viewed as dress rehears-
als for the parliamentary elections. Th e results of the 
regional assembly elections in March 2007 (see Table) 
suggest that UR will continue its domination, but 
with a slightly diﬀ erent supporting ensemble. Across 
14 regions comprising one-third of the electorate, only 
UR and the CPRF managed to compete and win party 
list seats in every region. UR led in all but one region, 
averaging 44 percent of the party list vote. CPRF 
averaged 16 percent of the vote, but only managed a 
second place fi nish in half of the contests. Just Russia 
(JR) averaged 15 percent and won seats in 13 regions, 
while the Liberal Democratic Party brought up the 
rear with just over 9 percent of the vote and winning 
seats in 11 regions. One liberal party, Union of Right 
Forces, managed to compete in nine regions, though 
it was barred in Dagestan, Vologda Oblast, and Pskov 
Oblast (it was initially barred in Samara, though the 
decision was overturned by the Central Electoral 
Commission). Th ough the party did surprisingly well 
in crossing the 7 percent threshold in 5 regions and 
narrowly missing in a further 2 regions, it poses no 
clear threat to the main parties. Out of the remaining 
9 parties that competed in various regional campaigns, 
only 3 managed to win seats in one or two regions: 
the Agrarian Party in Dagestan and Vologda Oblast, 
Patriots of Russia in Dagestan, and the Greens in Sa-
mara Oblast.
Th e critical intrigue emerging from the March 
2007 elections involves the rapid rise of the newly cre-
ated Just Russia, which already commands signifi cant 
resources and the tacit support of the Kremlin. Th e 
three parties that merged to form JR (Party of Life, 
Pensioners’ Party, and Motherland) started to show 
their collective muscle in the October 2006 regional 
elections, gathering 50 percent more donations than 
they managed individually in 2005. In March 2007, 
JR’s campaign funds (400 million rubles) were second 
only to UR (600 million rubles). Th ese are impressive 
sums when one considers that the total accumulated 
for all parties over the March and October 2006 elec-
tions was 624 million rubles. Th is marks, in part, an 
infl ux of new regional elites from the business world 
seeking to establish a foothold in regional politics. 
Th e party’s pro-Kremlin orientation yielded addition-
al benefi ts in terms of insulation from the exploitation 
of “administrative resources” to deny it a chance to 
compete: of the four parties that competed in all 14 
regions last March, only UR and JR did not suﬀ er any 
diﬃ  culties in securing registration. 
Th e appearance of JR as a pro-Kremlin opposition 
party potentially threatens UR’s hold over regional 
elites. Th ough governors led most of UR’s party lists 
in past campaigns, the intervention of the party’s cen-
tral organs in the compilation of regional lists meant 
that warring factions within regional branches were 
incorporated into the same party list, eﬀ ectively pa-
pering over internal divisions and driving confl icts 
among regional elites into UR’s regional branches. If 
support for UR in 2003 was understood as unequivo-
cal support for Putin (and therefore mandatory), the 
appearance of JR means that regional leaders can 
safely back an opposition party without opposing the 
Kremlin. Th e potential danger for UR was vividly il-
lustrated in Lipetsk Oblast last October, where Sergei 
Mironov (now head of JR) secured Putin’s permission 
Table: March 2007 Regional Assembly Elections








United Russia 44.05% 14 14
Communist Party 16.04% 14 14
Just Russia 15.53% 14 13
Liberal Democratic Party 9.62% 14 11
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to use the president’s image during the campaign. Th e 
situation put the Lipetsk branch of UR in a particu-
larly awkward position since its list included the gov-
ernor, the speaker of the legislative assembly, and the 
mayor of the regional capital. As the December 2007 
elections draw near, dissatisfaction within UR should 
directly benefi t JR by transforming confl icts within 
the “party of power” into an inter-party competition. 
One tangible consequence is that UR and JR are likely 
to become engaged in a bidding war for the support 
of the regions, as evidenced by Mironov’s recent sug-
gestion that gubernatorial elections could be restored 
and the various proposals by UR to grant governors 
the power to directly appoint mayors.
Th e performance of JR thus provides a measure 
of (and stimulus for) fragmentation among regional 
elites. In regions where the elite unite behind UR, the 
role of JR will be limited to picking oﬀ  smaller parties. 
By contrast, regions with fragmented elites are likely 
to feature direct competition between the two parties. 
One can already fi nd instances of this eﬀ ect where the 
availability of JR provides opportunities for mayors 
in capital cities to oppose governors in their regions. 
Stavropol Mayor Sergei Kuzmin formed a weighty 
JR faction with the aim of eventually forcing the re-
gion’s unpopular governor out of oﬃ  ce, dealing UR 
an outright defeat in the region’s March 2007 elec-
tion. Other mayors of regional capitals may seek to 
back the opposition given the possibility that the State 
Duma may eliminate mayoral elections in exchange 
for the governors’ support of UR. Th ere is no small bit 
of irony in this, given Putin’s record with gubernato-
rial appointments. In regions where elites are relatively 
divided, he has appointed political outsiders that are 
unable to stand independent of the Kremlin’s support. 
Insofar as this has resulted in a number of weak gover-
nors in the more developed and signifi cant regions, JR 
may derive added value from their vulnerability. 
Th ese factors combine to put Russia’s governors in 
an interesting position. On the one hand, there are no 
clear sanctions to supporting JR. Th e Kremlin has not 
made extensive use of its power to sack governors, and 
further sackings are unlikely as the elections approach. 
It has not articulated clear limits to its tolerance for 
JR’s electoral success, aside from the prediction by 
the deputy head of the Presidential Administration, 
Vladislav Surkov, that UR would remain the leading 
party in parliament until 2011 with JR in a support-
ing role. Unlike the 1999 and 2003 campaigns, the 
performance of either party in December 2007 does 
not appear to be implicated in Putin’s choice of a suc-
cessor or his electoral prospects. As a result, the gover-
nors potentially have the most autonomy to infl uence 
the conduct of the national parliamentary campaign 
since the 1999 campaign. 
At the same time, the governors tend to be risk 
averse. If they detect uncertainty in the Kremlin’s 
mandate, their response is likely to be continued sup-
port for UR rather than a crusade on behalf of JR. 
While this might appear to be a safer approach, it po-
tentially leaves them in an even weaker position in re-
gions where the political and business elite are seeking 
alternatives. Even if this results in a diminished vote 
for UR, however, such an outcome might still work to 
the Kremlin’s advantage in facilitating the turnover 
of the regional elite and the identifi cation of new or 
potential partners within the regions.
Conclusion
Assessing the regional dimension of the upcoming electoral cycle points to hidden fault lines in Rus-
sian politics that could provide short term surprises 
with longer term consequences. Th ere is little doubt 
that United Russia will remain the largest party in 
the State Duma, though the nature and extent of its 
victory will be determined by the battles in provincial 
trenches. And while it remains uncontroversial to as-
sume that Putin’s designated successor will meet with 
little resistance in 2008, the end game concerns the 
new president’s ability to mobilize the support and 
compliance of the regions. Th e Kremlin’s attempt to 
fashion a loyal opposition in the form of Just Russia 
oﬀ ers a means to incorporate new and existing mem-
bers of the regional elite that are dissatisfi ed with the 
current “party of power.” Th is could translate into sig-
nifi cant gains for JR over its performance in March 
2007 such that it would become the second largest 
party in the State Duma. In the long run, however, 
the tactic of exploiting divisions within the regions 
may undermine the levers of central control over the 
regions, even threatening the elite consensus support-
ing the present regime. 
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